ABSTRACT Recently, the Internet of Things (IoT) is attracting significant attention from both academia and industry. To connect the huge amount of IoT devices effectively, software-defined networking (SDN) is considered as a promising way because of its centralized network management and programmable routing logic. However, due to the limited resources in both the data plane and the control plane, SDN is vulnerable to the new-flow attack, which can disable the SDN-based IoT by exhausting the switches or the controller. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a smart security mechanism (SSM) to defend against the new-flow attack. The SSM uses the standard southbound and northbound interfaces of SDN, and it includes a low-cost method that monitors the new-flow attack by reusing the asynchronous messages on the control link. The monitor method can differentiate the new-flow attack from the normal flow burst by checking the hit rate of the flow entries. Based on the monitoring result, the SSM uses a dynamic access control method to mitigate the new-flow attack by perceiving the behavior of the security middleware in the IoT. The dynamic access control method can intercept the attack flows at their access switch. Extensive simulations and testbed-based experiments are conducted and the corresponding results verify the feasibility of our claims.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is considered as one future networking paradigm because of its promise that people and things can be connected at anytime and anyplace. To fulfill this promise, heterogeneous communication technologies such as wireless sensor networks (WSNs), radio frequency identification (RFID), and machine-to-machine (M2M) are integrated in the IoT [1] . As a result, much more users with different service requirements are connected to the forwarding devices in the public network. That makes traditional IP networking unsuitable when dealing with various IoT scenarios. In order to connect IoT scenarios effectively, different communication protocols are proposed in physical and network layers [2] - [4] . However, due to the vendor-driven property of traditional IP networking, these proposals are not widely deployed.
Recently, software-defined networking (SDN) provides a new way to achieve the idea of IoT. The main difference between SDN and traditional IP networking is the decoupling of the data plane and the control plane [5] . In the SDN architecture, the control logic is decoupled from the underlying switches and centralized in the network controller. Therefore, the switches are free from routing calculation and focused on packet forwarding, the controller can decide the routing path of a flow according to its communication context. That makes SDN become custom-driven and show great advantage in routing and management for zillions of devices in the IoT [6] .
Motivated by this advantage, lots of studies [7] - [11] try to improve the IoT using the SDN architecture. As presented in Fig. 1 , we summarize the differences between the legacy IoT and the software defined IoT. In SDN-based IoT, the SDN architecture serves as a bridge between the IoT communication scenario and the middleware. The IoT participants can send packets directly to the SDN-enabled switch instead of sending to the specific IoT gateway. Moreover, the SDN architecture supports fine-grained flow classification and flexible routing management. With highly customized routing logics that are programmed as applications in the SDN architecture, the data from various IoT communication scenarios can be easily and orderly guided to the server or middleware.
It should be noted that, the flexible and effective SDNbased IoT also inherits the security issue of the SDN architecture. In the SDN routing system, the switches request the controller to assign routing rules actively and cache routing rules passively through the control link. However, the control link bandwidth and the cache space that are regulated by the southbound interface (e.g., OpenFlow [12] ) have been proved to be limited [13] . That provokes cyber attackers to find better solutions to attack the public network, such as the infrastructure layer DDoS attack [14] , controller-switch communication flooding and switch flow table flooding attacks [15] . These cyber attacks can cut off the bridge between IoT devices and IoT servers in SDN-based IoT [6] .
We carefully studied this security issue of the SDN architecture and the corresponding suggestions. We believe that the aforementioned cyber attacks belong to the new-flow attack, because the attackers must send lots of unmatched packets to the SDN-enable switch. These unmatched packets are treated as new flows by the SDN routing system and lead to a series of subsequent processes in both the data plane and the control plane [16] , [17] . The attackers aim to exhaust either the SDN-enabled switch or the controller with intensive new flows. According to the valuable suggestions [18] , to defend against such an new-flow attack that targets the data plane and the control plane, attack detection and access control are promising approaches.
In the literature, existing solutions [19] - [21] that detect attacks with the SDN architecture usually invoke lots of controller-switch communication to acquire the network statistics and they may aggravate the control link bandwidth consumption during the new-flow attack. Meanwhile, a few proposals [22] , [23] rebuild the access control rules in the controller to intercept attack flows at the boundary switches of SDN. Although these proposals intercept prescribed packets, they cannot adapt to the constantly changing attack packets since they use static access control rules. The static access control rules are not effective when attack packets are disguised as various normal flows. Recently, powerful IoT security middleware is considered as a promising way to deal with suspicious flows [24] , [25] . However, because of its physical location and the absence of unified interface, it is hard for the security middleware to intercept the attack flows at their access switch actively.
Therefore, in order to defend against the new-flow attack with the consideration of low cost monitoring and dynamic access control at the attackers' access switch, in this paper, we propose a smart security mechanism (SSM). With SSM, the controller can detect the new-flow attack by reusing the standard asynchronous messages on the control link. Two specific traffic features are designed to monitor the newflow attack. According to the monitoring results, SSM first redirects suspicious flows to the security middleware in the IoT, then it perceives the filtering results of the security middleware. Based on that, SSM assigns the access control rules to intercept the attack flows at their access switch in SDN-based IoT.
With the SSM, we established a executable and practical simulation environment to represent the SDN routing system. Extensive simulations and testbed-based experiments are conducted to prove the performance of SSM. Here we summarize the main contributions of this paper as follows.
• We prove that, the limited resources in both the data plane and the control plane make SDN vulnerable to the new-flow attack, which can cut off the communication between IoT devices and IoT servers in SDN-based IoT.
• We propose a smart security mechanism (SSM) to monitor and mitigate the new-flow attack using the standard southbound and northbound interfaces. SSM achieves a low cost monitoring and makes the SDN controller aware of the filtering results of the security middleware in SDN-based IoT.
• We conduct extensive simulations and the corresponding results show that, SSM achieves more than 85% precision rate and it can intercept the attack flows dynamically at their access switch in SDN-based IoT.
• We develop SSM as an application and test SSM in our testbed, the experiment results prove that SSM is a practical solution to defend against the new-flow attack. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related work. In Section 3, we briefly review the preliminary knowledge of SDN and OpenFlow protocol that we use in this paper. In Section 4, we propose the smart security mechanism to defend against the new-flow attack in SDN-based IoT. Simulations and testbed-based experiments are presented in Section 5 and Section 6. Finally, we conclude this paper and discuss future work in Section 7. 
II. RELATED WORK
Below we briefly summarize the recent security studies about both the SDN architecture and the IoT.
A. SECURING THE IoT WITH THE SDN ARCHITECTURE
The combination of IoT and SDN definitely brings tremendous advantage in network resources visualization and network management simplification. As a result, lots of studies try to securing the IoT with the SDN architecture.
Chakrabarty et al. [26] express concern about the security functions provided by the existing IoT protocols. They propose Black SDN, which is an SDN-based architecture for secure IoT communication. In their proposal, both the packet header and payload are encrypted. To forward the encrypted packets efficiently, they use the SDN controller as the trusted third party. They try to mitigate the passive attacks, such as traffic analysis and inference attack.
Bull et al. [27] summarise the security issues of both the IoT device and the IoT network. Based on their previous work [28] , they propose a method to detect and mitigate anomalous behaviour at the SDN-based IoT gateway. By presetting flow entries in the SDN-based IoT gateway, they gather source and destination statistics of flows and classify the network state. In addition, three possible mintage actions are prepared to deal with the detected anomalous behaviour.
Flauzac et al. [29] emphasize that the traditional Ad-Hoc network is lack of traffic monitoring and access control, due to the absence of the network infrastructure. To this end, they propose an SDN-based IoT architecture. In their proposed architecture, each node in the Ad-Hoc network is viewed as a combination of SDN-enable switch and legacy host. Then they use security controllers to monitor traffic and execute security polices in the Ad-Hoc network.
Sandor et al. [30] try to improve the resilience of IoT communication by using SDN's flexible routing feature. They assume that there are serval redundant routers for the communication in IoT networks. When the original communication link is disabled by cyber attacks, they use the SDN controller to select a new link for the communication.
Choi and Kwak [31] present a secure SDN-based IoT framework, in which the SDN control plane is rebuilt to provide security services such as authentication/access control, IDS/IPS, and lightweight encryption. Based on that, they explain the working processes of these security services and evaluate their proposal under an SYN flooding attack.
B. NOVEL DoS ATTACKS AIMING FOR THE SDN ARCHITECTURE
A Denial of Service (DoS) attack is an attack with the purpose of preventing legitimate users from using a specified network resource [32] . Different with the traditional DoS attacks that target the special hosts, the novel DoS attacks aim to exhaust the network resources of the data plane and the control plane in the SDN architecture. This kind of attacks threats the working foundation of the SDN archtecture. Therefore, many studies try to discuss and defend against the novel DoS attacks in SDN.
Kandoi and Antikainen [33] discuss the DoS attack to the control link bandwidth and the switch's flow table. They prove that the timeout value of flow entries, and the control pane bandwidth effect the performance of such an attack. If not configured appropriately, SDN can be disabled by such an attack. They propose some possible mitigation strategies based on their simulations.
FlowRanger [34] tries to improve the controller performance when the controller is under attack. When the controller is busy processing the requests from the data plane, FlowRanger sets priority to the request. The request from the user which has appeared many times during the normal condition (no sign of attacks) has a higher priority. The request from the user which appears during the attack has a lower priority. In this way, it improves the serving rate of the normal users' requests.
Mousavi and St-Hilaire [35] show how the DoS attack exhausts controller resources and propose a solution to detect such an attack. They monitor the entropy features of the requests received by the controller. They assume that, when the attack flows use spoofed destination addresses, the randomness of flows and the entropy features decrease obviously. Their method aims to detect the attack within the first five hundred packets of the attack traffic.
Yu et al. [36] pay attention to the DoS attack to the OpenFlow-enabled switch. They propose a QoS-aware peer support strategy that integrates idle flow table resources to mitigate the flow table overloading attack. They try to make SDN more resistant to such an attack and avoid severe damages at the beginning the attack.
Dong et al. [37] propose a detection method for the DoS attack to the controller by monitoring the low-traffic flows. The low-traffic flows have fewer packets than the normal flows and can lead to significant resources consumption in the control plane. We detected such an attack by using Sequential Probability Ration Test (SPRT) to control the false negative and false positive error rates. However, the monitoring cost and mitigation strategy are not well considered.
Therefore, in this paper, based on the careful study of the novel DoS attacks in SDN, we believe that the novel DoS attacks aiming at the data plane and the control plane of SDN essentially belong to the new-flow attack, and we propose a smart security mechanism (SSM) to defend against the newflow attack.
III. PRELIMINARY KNOWLEDGE
In this section, we briefly review the working principle of SDN and the control link messages of the standard OpenFlow protocol that we use in this paper.
A. WORKING PRINCIPLE OF SDN
In the SDN paradigm, as shown in Fig. 2 , the network architecture consists of three planes. The data plane is the bottom plane that is made up of SDN-enabled switches. The SDN-enabled switches send routing requests to the control plane instead of calculating routing rules by themselves when they receive new flows. Then the control plane calculates paths for the requests and assigns the routing rules in compliance with the applications in the top application plane.
All the routing requests from the data plane and the switch configurations from the control plane are transmitted through the southbound interface, corresponding messages on the control link are regulated by the southbound protocol such as OpenFlow. All the controller configurations are sent through the northbound interface, corresponding messages are regulated by the northbound protocol such as REST [38] .
B. OpenFlow PROTOCOL
According to the OpenFlow specification [12] , the control link messages mainly include the Asynchronous Messages and the Controller-to-Switch Messages. The Asynchronous Messages are used by the OpenFlow-enabled switches to notify the controller of a network event, such as flow arrival and flow termination. They are inevitable control link cost for the SDN system. The Controller-to-Switch Messages are used by the controller to configure the OpenFlow-enabled switches, such as installing flow enties and pulling statistics. It should be noted that an application must pay attention to its invocations of the Controller-to-Switch Messages, because the control link bandwidth is limited. Here we list the OpenFlow messages that our SSM mainly uses in this paper.
1) PACKET-IN MESSAGE
The Packet-In Message belongs to the Asynchronous Messages. When a switch receives a packet and can not match it with any cached flow entries, the switch sends a Packet-In Message to the controller.
As shown in Fig. 3 , we present a Packet-In Message captured in our testbed. We can see that, the unmatched packet is encapsulated in the Packet-In Message and sent to the controller. The packet header of the Packet-In Message records the source address of the switch, and the payload of the Packet-In Message records the whole unmatched packet and its buffer information. 
2) FLOW REMOVED MESSAGE
The Flow Removed Message also belongs to the Asynchronous Messages. When a flow leaves from a switch, the switch sends a Flow Removed Message to the controller.
According to the OpenFlow protocol, the statistics of the removed flow are sent to the controller using the corresponding fields in the Flow Removed Message. As shown in Fig. 4 , we present a Flow Removed Message captured in our testbed. We can see that, the flow duration field records the time length of the removed flow, the packet count field records the packet number of the removed flow. In addition, the reason field explains why the flow leaves the switch. When the reason field indicates an idle timeout, it means the flow entry is removed since there is no packet of that flow for a certain length of time. For the other reasons, it means the flow entry is evicted actively according to the flow delete order as shown in Fig. 4 . 
3) MULTIPART MESSAGES
The Multipart Messages belong to the Controller-to-Switch Messages, they are designed to encode requests or replies that have a large amount of data and cannot fit in a single OpenFlow message. The Multipart Messages are primarily used for the controller to gather the statistics from the switches.
In order to maintain a global view of the data plane, the controller periodically gathers the statistics from the switches using the Multipart Messages. As shown in Fig. 5 , we present a series of Multipart Messages captured in our testbed and the flow table snapshot in the OpenDaylight [39] controller. We can see that, these Multipart Messages are used to update the flow table statistics in the controller. In the flow table, each flow entry has its own match fields, counters, and actions. For example, the duration counter records the active time of the flow, the packet counter records the matched packet amount of the flow. The match fields are used to differentiate each fine-grained flow.
IV. DEFEND AGAINST NEW-FLOW ATTACK IN SDN
In this section, we first explain the new-flow attack in SDN and show how to launch such an attack. Then, we propose our smart security mechanism to defend against the new-flow attack. SSM includes a low cost monitoring method and a dynamic access control method.
A. NEW-FLOW ATTACK IN SDN
The new-flow attackers aim to inject lots of unmatched packets to the SDN-enabled switches. According to the working principle of SDN, these unmatched packets are treated as new flows. Therefore, these packets are encapsulated in the Packet-In Messages and sent to the controller, the controller calculates the routing paths and sends Controller-to-Switch Messages to each switch in the paths to forward the new flows, i.e., install flow entries.
To demonstrate that the SDN architecture is vulnerable to the new-flow attack, and to make our work practical and meaningful, we have conducted two experiments to illustrate the impact of the new-flow attack.
First, we develop a REST-base program, which forces the controller, i.e., OpenDaylight, to assign static flow entries, to test the flow entry capacity of the switch. The static flow entries will not be removed until we delete them. In this experiment, two laptops communicate with each other through the test OvS-based switch [40] , we observe the communication breakdowns when 15000-20000 flow entries are assigned to the test switch. However, it should be noted that the OvSbased switch dose not use TCAM to cache flow entries, most of the commercial switches are equipped with small TCAMs that support about 8000 flow entries [41] , [42] .
Second, we inject attack packets to the SDN-enabled switch to simulate the new-flow attack. In order to confuse the controller, we make two laptops with Linux system to send packets to each other through our testbed. Each attack packet holds a different source IP address and asks the SDN routing system to assign a specific flow entry. Fig. 6 shows the impacts on the data plane and the control plane. The idle timeout value and the new-flow attack rate decide the number of flow entries consumed in the victim switch. By calculating the Asynchronous Messages and the Controllerto-Switch Messages invoked by the injected packets, we get a conservative estimation of the consumption on the control link. The average length of the routing paths for the injected packets and the attack rate decide the amount of messages invoked on the control link. As discussed in the related study [33] , the bandwidth of the control link is usually set as 100Mbps. Therefore, the new-flow attack is an obvious threaten for SDN.
B. DEFEND AGAINST NEW-FLOW ATTACK WITH SSM
In this subsection, we first present the overall architecture and working principle of our smart security mechanism. Then we propose a low cost monitoring method to detect the new-flow attack. Finally, we propose a dynamic access control method to mitigate the new-flow attack.
1) OVERALL ARCHITECTURE AND WORKING PRINCIPLE OF SSM
As shown in Fig. 7 , SSM belongs to the application plane, and it consists of two parts: the detection module and the mitigation module. The detection module monitors the newflow attack by listening to the Asynchronous Messages on the control link. It notifies the mitigation module when it detects an attack. The mitigation module is responsible for assigning dynamic access control rules.
In order to make sure that the detection module is practical, we pay our attention to the monitoring features and VOLUME 5, 2017 monitoring cost for the new-flow attack, because the detection module faces the challenges that are summarized below.
• First, the new-flow attack is difficult to detect. Traditional monitoring features, such as destination IP entropy [43] and TCP protocol proportion [44], are not effective when dealing with the arbitrary injected packets of the new-flow attack, because the attack flows perform like the normal flow burst.
• Second, the monitoring cost is limited. Even the injected packets trigger abnormal traditional monitoring features, statistics collection processes of the existing methods invoke lots of control link messages that may overload the control link bandwidth during the new-flow attack. As a daily running module in the application plane, the detection module should control its monitoring cost.
• Last, the detection process should provide input to the mitigation process. Since the new-flow attack threats the working foundation of SDN, it should be mitigated quickly before the switch or controller is disabled. Therefore, the detection module should notify the mitigation module of the victim switch and the attacker's location. To deal with these challenges, we propose two monitoring features: the request rate of switch and the match efficiency of switch. The request rate of switch represents the amount of unmatched packets during a period of time. It is an important feature for both the new-flow attack and the normal flow burst. Besides, the match efficiency of switch represents the average hit rate of the flow entries during a period of time. It is designed to differentiate the new-flow attack from the normal flow burst. Since the arbitrary injected packets aim to generate new flows in SDN, these injected packets hit no flow entries that are assigned to the victim switch. On the contrary, the packets of the burst normal flows hit their flow entries fast.
Meanwhile, most of the network statistics that our monitoring features need can be acquired through the Asynchronous Messages on the control link, In this way, the detection module can control its monitoring cost. When the monitoring features indicate a new-flow attack, the detection module gives a victim port list to the mitigation module to activate the mitigation process. The detail implementation of the detection module is described in Section 4.2.2.
In the mitigation module, we focus on the dynamic access control because of the following properties.
• First, static access control in the controller [22] , [23] is not effective, since the injected packets can be disguised as different normal flows.
• Second, the attack rate is so high that we cannot allow the controller to assign a flow entry for each attack flow whether the action is forwarding or dropping. However, the controller only checks the integrity of the packet encapsulated in the Packet-In Message [12] , it cannot differentiate the attack flows from the normal flows effectively. Therefore, we redirect the suspicious flows from the victim port to the security middleware, which can filter out attack flows. Then, we perceive the behavior of the security middleware by analyzing the flow tables in its directly connected switches. Finally, the perceived behavior can be assigned as the dynamic access control rules to the victim switches. The detail implementation of the mitigation module is described in Section 4.2.3.
2) NEW-FLOW ATTACK DETECTION
As aforementioned, we use the request rate of switch to monitor the flow burst in the data plane, and the match efficiency of switch to differentiate the new-flow attack from the normal flow burst. As shown in Fig. 8 , the detection module first establishes the baselines of the proposed monitoring features during the normal condition (no sign of attacks), then it monitors the real time values of these features to detect the new-flow attack. When the detection module establishes the baselines, we use a discrete time model where the time horizon is divided into T time slots. Each time slot has equal length w, which is the idle timeout value of the SDN system. Based on the discrete time model, Algorithm 1 shows the establishment process.
During a time slot, e.g., time slot t, the detection module inspects the source address of the Packet-In Message. All the Packet-In Messages sent from switch i are considered as a 
set PIM t i . Then, the request rate of switch i for time slot t is defined as
where, card(PIM t i ) represents the amount of routing requests that are sent from switch i in time slot t. For T time slots, we get a set of request rates of switch i that
Meanwhile, the detection module inspects the source address, packet count, duration and reason fields of the the Flow Removed Message. All the Flow Removed Messages sent from switch i are considered as a set FRM t i . Then, the match efficiency of switch i for time slot t is defined as
where, card(FRM t i ) represents the amount of removed flows from switch i in time slot t. L k , T k , and e k represent the packet count (i.e., the final number of matched packets), flow duration (i.e., the final number of seconds) and reason fields in the kth Flow Removed Message, respectively. e k is a Boolean value, which will be set to 1 only if the reason filed declares an idle timeout. For T time slots, we get a set of match efficiencies of switch i that
To set baselines for the request rate and match efficiency of switch i, we consider the percentage of valid samples for set R i and E i , and denote it as the parameter α. For example, in R i , some outliers caused by the novel flow burst are excluded, and the valid request rate samples account for α percent. Therefore, the baselines, i.e., R T i and E T i , can be calculated by the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of R i and E i , and they satisfy that
The baselines R T i and E T i indicate the maximum allowed request rate and the minimum allowed match efficiency of switch i. When the detection module monitors the new-flow attack, it determines the location of the victim port using Algorithm 2. The detection module first calculates the real time request rate of switch i using equation (1) . When the real time request rate R i (t) is bigger than its R T i , there is flow burst at switch i. To determine wether switch i is compromised by the new-flow attack, the detection module gets flow table statistics of switch i from the controller and calculates the current match efficiency of switch i by
Algorithm 2 Victim Port Location
where, FE i represents the set of flow entries in switch i. l k and t k are values in the packet counter (i.e., the current number of matched packets) and duration counter (i.e., the current number of seconds) of the kth flow entry. When the current match efficiency of switch i is smaller than its E T i , which means lots of flow entries in switch i are hardly hit, the detection module confirms a new-flow attack and locates the victim port using the port's match efficiency that
where FE i,p represents the set of flow entries in switch i for port p. When E i,p (t) E T i , we denote it as victim port VP i,p and mitigate the new-flow attack for it.
Since the baseline establishment process reuses the Asynchronous Messages and the monitoring process only sends Multipart Messages to the switch when its request rate exceeds the corresponding baseline, the detection module achieves a low cost on the control link.
3) NEW-FLOW ATTACK MITIGATION
As aforementioned, the preset static access control rules are not effective to deal with the new-flow attack, and we cannot assign a flow entry for each attack flow to mitigate the VOLUME 5, 2017 victim port. Therefore, as shown in Fig. 9 , the mitigation module first redirects the suspicious flows from VP i,p to the security middleware, then it begins to perceive the behavior of the security middleware. Based on the perceiving results, the mitigation module assigns flow entries on the compromised switch to intercept the attack flows.
Given the redirection order, the unmatched packets (wether legitimate or illegal) are redirected to the security middleware. Therefore, the injected packets on VP i,p cannot invoke a series of subsequent processes in both the data plane and the control plane. Comparing to the controller, the security middleware is more powerful and accurate when dealing with the illegal packets [44] .
However, the security middleware cannot report its filtering logs to the controller according to the current southbound interface. To make the controller aware of the filtering results, we propose Algorithm 3 to perceive the access control rules on the security middleware.
Algorithm 3 Access Control Rule Perceiving
Input: Flow The mitigation module first gets flow table statistics of the switches that are directly connected to the security middleware. Then, it finds all flow entries that guide flows into the security middleware by checking the out port in the actions, we denote these flow entries as
Further, it finds all flow entries that guide flows out of the security middleware by checking the in port in the match fields, we denote these flow entries as
It should be noted that, the legitimate packets can pass through the security middleware while the illegal packets are intercepted. This means the legitimate packets have flow entries in both FE in and FE out while the illegal packets only have flow entries in FE in . Therefore, the mitigation module then checks the match fields of FE in and FE out . It decides whether FE in (k) servers for the illegal packets and belongs to the black list (BL) by
Likewise, by checking both match fields and packet counter, the mitigation module decides whether FE in (k) servers for the legitime packets and belongs to the white list (WL) by
. (11) In this way, the mitigation module perceives the behavior of security middleware. Since the packets are redirected from VP i,p , we can execute the BL and WL on switch i to intercept the illegal packets and protect the legitimate packets at the attackers' access switch. During this process, the mitigation module controls the assignment rate to avoid making the flow table full. In addition, it updates the BL and WL by periodically perceiving the behavior of the security middleware.
V. SIMULATION AND RESULT
In this section, we conduct extensive simulations to evaluate the performance of our proposed method. First, we build an SDN environment using MATLAB, and establish the baselines of our monitoring features using the 24-hour data mirrored from our campus boundary routers. Then, we evaluate SSM for both new-flow detection and mitigation using the attack records from our testbed.
A. SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT AND BASELINE ESTABLISHMENT
To simulate the SDN system, we mainly focus on the flow table and the Asynchronous Messages at time t. As the timing diagram shown in Fig. 10 , we use w to represent the idle timeout value. Black, gray and white rectangles indicate the packets of flow a, flow b and flow c, respectively. In order to calculate the flow table at time t, we count the active flows during w. For example in Fig. 10 Based on that, we build an SDN environment shown in Fig. 11 and adopt the 24-hour data mirrored from our campus boundary routers. The dataset records the arrival time and IP header of each packet. We replay the dataset in the SDN environment to establish the baselines for our monitoring features.
For the first monitoring feature, i.e. request rate of switch, we get R i and its CDF shown in Fig. 12 . We can see that, the request rate of switch shows a great difference between the daytime and nighttime, the maximum R i is 130 per second at 1 pm while the minimum R i is almost 0 per second at night. In this paper, we set α to 0.9. As aforementioned in Algorithm 1, we calculate the baseline for R i (i.e., R T i ) according to its CDF. As shown in Fig. 12 , the value of R T i is 84. Likewise, for the second monitoring feature, i.e., match efficiency of switch, we get E i and its CDF shown in Fig. 13 . We can see that, the maximum E i achieves almost 30 packets per flow per time slot while the minimum E i is less than 7 packets per flow per time slot. As shown in Fig. 13 , the value of E T i is 7.5.
B. NEW-FLOW ATTACK DETECTION AND MITIGATION
To simulate the new-flow attack at different rates, we adopt the packet records of new-flow attacks in our testbed, and replay it with our normal dataset at different times. When we monitor the new-flow attack, we get R i for different attack rates and times shown in Fig. 14 . We can see that the request rate of switch increases linearly with increasing attack rate. For the request rate of switch that stays above the baseline plane, our algorithm, i.e., Algorithm 2, views it as the flow burst in the data plane.
It should be mentioned that, in the real world, the normal flow burst also triggers a large request rate of switch. To differentiate the normal flow burst and new-flow attack, we calculate the match efficiency of switch and we get Fig. 15 . We can see that the match efficiency of switch decreases greatly with increasing attack rate. For a flow burst in the data plane, when the match efficiency of switch stays below the baseline plane, our algorithm, i.e., Algorithm 2, views it as the new-flow attack.
To illustrate how accurate our monitoring method is to the simulation scenarios, we present the monitoring results in Fig. 16 . The white rectangles indicate the correct judgements while the gray and back rectangles indicate the wrong judgements. We can see that, both the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) errors are distributed in the area that the attack rates are relatively low. The FP errors are mainly caused by the normal flow burst in the daytime while the FN errors are mainly caused by the low request rate of switch at nighttime. During the simulation, the precision rate of our monitoring method achieves 86.32%.
When we mitigate the new-flow attack, we first redirect the suspicious packets from the victim port to the security middleware and then execute dynamic access control by perceiving the behavior of the security middleware. Here we simulate the new-flow attack at 10 am, the simulation settings are shown in Table 1 . From Fig. 16 and Table 1 , we can see that our monitoring method confirms the new-flow attacks. As aforementioned, our algorithm, i.e., Algorithm 2, begins to build victim port set VP according to the match efficiency of port. The corresponding values and the mitigation effects are presented in Fig. 17 .
From Fig. 17 , we can see that, when the attack flows are injected to S 1 and S 2 , the match efficiency of port decreases obviously at the 3rd time slot. According to the baseline E T i , the victim port set is {VP 1,2 , VP 2,1 , VP 2,2 }. Then the redirection orders are assigned to these ports to mitigate the newflow attacks. Since the attack flows cannot generate barely hit flow entries, the match efficiency of port increases. Meanwhile, our algorithm, i.e., Algorithm 3, begins to gather flow table statistics from S 3 and S 4 . Then it perceives the behavior of the security middleware and executes dynamic access control. We compare the redirected flow amounts of situations that with and without the dynamic access control in Fig. 18 .
Since the access control rules are assigned, the attack flows are intercepted at S 1 and S 2 , and less flows are redirected to the security middleware comparing to the situation that without the dynamic access control.
VI. EXPERIMENT AND RESULT
In this section, we focus on the feasibility of our smart security mechanism (SSM) in both new-flow detection and mitigation. Therefore, we implement SSM in our testbed. The testbed, as shown in Fig. 19(a) , has four components: one SDN controller and three SDN-enabled switches. Each component has an Intel Xeon E5606 CPU working at 2.13GHz and an 8G memory chip. We use OpenDaylight as the centralized controller and OpenvSwitch as the SDN-enabled switch. These components are operated with Ubuntu Linux 12.04. We develop SSM in the application plane and rebuild OpenDaylight to fit for SSM. We also develop a website shown in Fig. 19(b) to control SSM and display the statistics of the testbed.
During the experiments, we set one SDN-enabled switch as the security middleware by assigning filtering rules as static flow entries in it. An attacker and a FTP server are connected to our testbed. The attacker communicates with the FTP server and sends attack flows during the normal session. The attack rate is set as 50 packets per second using Hping [45] . To make our SSM work effectively with the OpenDaylight controller, we consider the valid sample proportion α as 0.9 and the length of each time slot is 10 seconds. We summarise the statistics records in SSM as Fig. 20 . From Fig. 20 , we can see that, during the 1∼4th time slots, the attacker communicates with the server normally and there is no flow redirected to the security middleware. During the 5∼7th time slots, the attacker injects fabricated packets and SSM monitors the anomaly in the data plane. By redirecting suspicious flows to the security middleware and executing dynamic access control, SSM begins to mitigate the new-flow attack at the 8th time slot.
It should be mentioned that, SSM controls the assignment rate of access control rules to avoid consuming the flow table in the compromised switch intensively. That explains the gradual decrement of redirected flow amount.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we prove that, because of SDN's inherent limitations in both the data plane and the control plane, SDNbased IoT is suffering from the new-flow attack, which injects lots of unmatched packets to exhaust the SDN routing system and cut off the communication between IoT devices and IoT servers. Based on the careful study of existing work, we propose the smart security mechanism (SSM) to defend against the new-flow attack. SSM includes a monitoring method and a mitigation method. The monitoring method reuses the standard Asynchronous Messages and controls the invocation of Controller-to-Switch Messages to achieve the low monitoring cost. It can differentiate the new-flow attack from the normal flow bust. The mitigation method redirects the suspicious flows to the security middleware in the IoT and makes the controller aware of the filtering results. Based on that, the mitigation method executes dynamic access control at the attackers' access switch in SDN-based IoT. We conduct extensive simulations and the results confirm that SSM can detect and mitigate the new-flow attack systematically. We also develop SSM as an application in our testbed using OpenFlow and REST interfaces, the experiment results from our testbed prove the feasibility of SSM.
We believe that, our work provides a practical direction to defend against the new-flow attack. Therefore, some further researches are expected to improve the calculation process of the normal baselines and the perceiving of the filtering results. VOLUME 5, 2017 
